<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Security on Corvus Blog</title><link>https://nicoleman0.github.io/blog-site/tags/security/</link><description>Recent content in Security on Corvus Blog</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Mon, 09 Feb 2026 00:00:00 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://nicoleman0.github.io/blog-site/tags/security/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Building Custom Evil Portal ESP32 Firmware</title><link>https://nicoleman0.github.io/blog-site/posts/esp32-evilportal/</link><pubDate>Mon, 09 Feb 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://nicoleman0.github.io/blog-site/posts/esp32-evilportal/</guid><description>&lt;p>Last night I developed some custom firmware for the ESP32 WROOM-32 that demonstrates captive portal attacks. This serves as both an educational tool and a practical demonstration of why users should be cautious when connecting to public WiFi networks.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;strong>Disclaimer:&lt;/strong> This tool is designed exclusively for authorized security testing and educational purposes. All testing was conducted on equipment I own in controlled environments.&lt;/p>
&lt;h2 id="what-is-a-captive-portal-attack">What Is a Captive Portal Attack?&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>Captive portals are the login pages you see when connecting to public WiFi at coffee shops, hotels, or airports. An evil portal attack exploits this familiar user experience by:&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Conpot Honeypot: First Day Attack Analysis</title><link>https://nicoleman0.github.io/blog-site/posts/conpot-first-day-report/</link><pubDate>Tue, 27 Jan 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://nicoleman0.github.io/blog-site/posts/conpot-first-day-report/</guid><description>&lt;h1 id="conpot-honeypot-first-day-attack-analysis">Conpot Honeypot: First Day Attack Analysis&lt;/h1>
&lt;p>Within the first 6 hours of operation, my Conpot ICS honeypot (emulating a Siemens S7-1200 PLC) attracted &lt;strong>40+ distinct attack sessions&lt;/strong> from &lt;strong>30+ unique IP addresses&lt;/strong> across multiple continents. The attacks ranged from automated scanning to targeted industrial protocol exploitation, including the first documented &lt;strong>S7comm diagnostic probe&lt;/strong> and a sustained &lt;strong>Next.js remote code execution campaign&lt;/strong>.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>This post analyzes the attack patterns observed, identifies gaps in the honeypot configuration, and extracts actionable threat intelligence for ICS security research.&lt;/p></description></item></channel></rss>